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IS THIS GOING TO BE ON THE TEST? RECONCILING THE FOURWAY CIRCUIT SPLIT
OVER HANDLING NOMINATIVE FAIR USE
Christian Ferlan*
Nominative fair use quietly allows the media to name sports
teams, musical groups, and other trademarked sources in their
reports, for the most part, without liability for infringement.
Consumers rely on nominative fair use to make efficient
purchasing decisions. It allows consumers to research and find
third-party reviews directly naming and comparing brands.
Without nominative fair use, consumers would have to rely on
descriptions of competing products not having the benefit of source
identifying marks. Producers rely on nominative fair use to
compare their products to those of competitors as well as to
describe certain qualities of their products. The United States
Circuit Courts of Appeals disagree on how to determine whether a
nominative use of another’s mark is a nominative fair use or an
infringement. The Second Circuit in International Information
Systems Security Certification Consortium v. Security University
created an eleven-part inquiry into nominative fair use. This
Recent Development argues that the Second Circuit should have
instead seized the opportunity to adopt the Ninth Circuit’s simpler
three-part test for nominative fair use.
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I.

INTRODUCTION—FAIR USE AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
Similar to the way the trademarked Apple logo gives
consumers information about the product bearing the mark such as
its price, ease of use, and source,1 certification marks expressly
* J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2018.
1
See Filipino Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Asian Journal Publ’ns, Inc., 198 F.3d 1143,
1147 (9th Cir. 1999) (first quoting Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. Goss, 6 F.3d
1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1993); and then 1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 12.01 (3d ed. 1992)) (“A mark answers the buyer’s
questions ‘Who are you?’ ‘Where do you come from?’ ‘Who vouches for you?’
But the [generic] name of the product answers the question ‘What are you?’”);
Apple Trademark List, APPLE, INC., http://www.apple.com/legal/intellectualproperty/trademark/appletmlist.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2016).
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serve to tell consumers that the product or service has a certain
“regional or other origin, material, mode of manufacture, quality,
accuracy, or other characteristics of such person’s goods or
services or that the work or labor on the goods or services was
performed by members of a union or other organization.”2 Without
certification marks consumers would not know if their groceries
are actually organic,3 or if the person a business hires to protect its
data knows how to develop a security program.4
Because someone other than the owner uses a certification
mark,5 owners have a greater interest in controlling how consumers
see the mark.6 Likewise, users have an interest in controlling how

2

15 U.S.C. § 1054 (2012). See, e.g., ENERGY STAR certification for your
building, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY & DEP’T OF ENERGY,
https://www.energystar.gov/buildings/facility-owners-and-managers/existingbuildings/earn-recognition/energy-star-certification (last visited Nov. 1, 2016)
(explaining the qualifications for ENERGY STAR certification and what the
ENERGY STAR certification mark tells consumers—whatever is bearing the
mark is “an energy–efficient top performer that saves money without sacrificing
performance”); U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRADEMARK MANUAL OF
EXAMINING
PROCEDURE
§ 1306.05(j)
(2016),
https://mpep.uspto.gov/RDMS/TMEP/current#/current/ch1300_d22670_21150_
d.html (showing examples of geographic certification marks including the
“Grown in Idaho” mark printed in a silhouette of the state of Idaho that “certifies
that goods identified by the mark are grown in Idaho and that the goods conform
to quality, grade and other requirements, pursuant to standards designated by the
Applicant”).
3
See AGRIC. MKTG. SERV., Organic Standards, U.S. DEP’T. OF AGRIC.,
https://www.ams.usda.gov/grades-standards/organic-standards (last visited Sept.
30, 2016).
4
See Certified Information Systems Security Professional, INT’L INFO. SYS.
SEC. CERTIFICATION CONSORTIUM, https://www.isc2.org/cissp/default.aspx (last
visited Sept. 30, 2016).
5
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012).
6
See Int’l Info. Sys. Sec. Certification Consortium, Inc. v. Sec. Univ., LLC,
823 F.3d 153, 163 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing Levy v. Kosher Overseers Ass’n of
Am., 104 F.3d 38, 39 (2d Cir. 1997)) (“‘[I]t is important for a consumer to
recognize the marks of the certification agencies that he trusts,’” and discussing
whether the alleged infringing mark is ‘confusingly similar’ to the plaintiffs’
mark.”); see also Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark
Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1916 (2007) (“Producers are able to frame
just about any argument for broader protection in terms of consumer
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competitors display the mark to keep the playing field level.7 When
users display the mark exactly as it is registered, consumers can
determine its exact meaning.8 However, when some users alter the
appearance of the mark or add adjectives to set their products and
services apart,9 consumers get a false impression that the user’s
products or services meet a different, higher standard than
competitors do.10
Normally, use of another’s mark or something close to it brings
a “likelihood of confusion” inquiry.11 However, when the user has
little or no choice but to employ another’s mark to describe the
user’s products or services,12 users are protected under the “fair
use” defense as long as the mark is used descriptively rather than
for its normal purpose of source identification.13 In addition, the
expectations, which they are in position to influence systematically through
marketing.”).
7
See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 767–68 (1992)
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012)) (“The Lanham Act was intended to make
‘actionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks’ and ‘to protect persons
engaged in commerce . . . against unfair competition.’”); see also Michael S.
Mireles, Jr., Towards Recognizing and Reconciling the Multiplicity of Values
and Interests in Trademark Law, 44 IND. L. REV. 427 (2011).
8
See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012).
9
For example, adding “super” to the “Organic” certification mark, falsely
leading consumers to believe that the product bearing “Super Organic” is more
organic than a product with the “Organic” certification mark. See cf Sec. Univ.,
823 F.3d at 157 (condemning defendant’s use of “Master” with plaintiff’s
certification mark as if to indicate that the certification could be mastered and
plaintiff offered this higher certification).
10
See id. at 158.
11
See generally, e.g., Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492,
495 (2d Cir. 1961) (laying out a list of eight non-exclusive factors that courts
should consider when determining whether one mark is too similar to another
mark such that consumers could be confused or misled as to the relationship
between the marks and the users); see also Sec. Univ., 823 F.3d at 159—60
(quoting Levy v. Kosher Overseers Ass’n of Am., Inc., 104 F.3d 38, 39 (2d Cir.
1997)) (“[c]ertification marks are generally treated the same as trademarks for
purposes of trademark law”).
12
See, e.g., Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Church, 411 F.2d 350, 352
(9th Cir. 1969) (permitting a business to use a registered trademark, the VW
symbol, to describe its services, fixing Volkswagens).
13
15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2012); KP Permanent Make-Up Inc. v. Lasting
Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 114 (2004).
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Ninth Circuit developed the doctrine of nominative fair use, which
allows businesses to use another’s mark to refer to the mark
owner’s products or services.14 Both fair use and nominative fair
use promote competition because the “likelihood of confusion”
factors15 tend to weigh in favor of restricting use simply because
the user has no choice but to employ another’s mark.16
Certification marks fit neatly into nominative fair use because
by definition the mark must be “used by a person other than its
owner.”17 Moreover, in the same way a nominative use of a
trademark refers to its owner’s goods or services, certification
marks are used to refer to the mark owner’s standard for certain
qualities or characteristics of the product or service bearing the
mark.18 In addition, an independent nominative fair use test
promotes judicial efficiency by eliminating discussion of
contextually erroneous factors and focusing on the defendant’s
need to use the mark and whether the defendant misrepresented the
plaintiff’s relation to the use.19 The Ninth Circuit controlled for
14

See, e.g., New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302,
304–06 (9th Cir. 1992) (allowing newspapers to use the New Kids on the Block
trademark in a poll, likening such use to a local newspaper being able to name
the Chicago Bulls in a recap of the previous night’s game rather than requiring
authors to say “the professional basketball team from Chicago”).
15
See infra Part II. Section B. (explaining in part that the verbiage of factors
will differ depending on the jurisdiction but the inquiry is essentially the same);
see also BARTON BEEBE, TRADEMARK LAW: AN OPEN–SOURCE CASEBOOK, Part
II: Trademark Infringement, 37 (3d ed. 2016), http://tmcasebook.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/08/BeebeTMLaw-3.0-Part-2-Infringement.pdf (showing a
chart of each circuit’s likelihood of confusion factors, marking common factors
and factors unique to individual circuits in part because the factor tests came out
of single cases from which courts adapt their interpretations and applications of
the individual factors).
16
See Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1151 (9th Cir. 2002)
(describing the need to exclude “likelihood of confusion” factors as unnecessary
and unfairly weighing in favor of restricting use).
17
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012).
18
Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (requiring certification marks to be registered
for use by someone other than the owner to refer to the owner’s certification
standards), with New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308 (giving businesses the
ability to refer to the mark owner’s product or service).
19
See Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 225
(3d Cir. 2005) (discussing the need to consolidate parts of a likelihood of
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such confusion by limiting the “likelihood of confusion” inquiry to
considering how the mark is used and what alternatives are
available to the user.20 However, since 1992 when the Ninth Circuit
introduced the doctrine, circuits have split over how exactly they
should approach the issue, the Third Circuit split in 2005,21 and the
Second Circuit split in 2016.22
In 2005, the Third Circuit created the circuit split by rejecting
the Ninth Circuit’s decision to replace the “likelihood of
confusion” analysis with a three-part test for nominative fair use.23
Instead, the Third Circuit adopted a broader, bifurcated approach
that made nominative fair use an affirmative defense, giving
defendants the opportunity to prevail even if the plaintiff proves
“likelihood of confusion.”24 It did, however, shorten the potentially
extensive analysis by instructing district courts to review only the

confusion inquiry in a nominative fair use context); see also 4 MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23:11 (4th ed. 2016) (“The Ninth
Circuit, in crafting a separate category of a ‘nominative fair use’ analysis,
created a specialized tool to analyze a certain class of cases of alleged
infringement. In that class of cases, there may be a competitive need to use
another’s trademark to identify the plaintiff in a way that is not likely to confuse
customers.”).
20
See New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308 (“First, the product or service
in question must be one not readily identifiable without use of the trademark;
second, only so much of the mark or marks may be used as is reasonably
necessary to identify the product or service; and third, the user must do nothing
that would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or endorsement
by the trademark holder.”).
21
See id. at 304; see also Century 21 Real Estate, 425 F.3d 211, 222 (3d Cir.
2005) (“Today we adopt a two-step approach in nominative fair use cases.”).
22
See generally Int’l Info. Sys. Sec. Certification Consortium, Inc. v. Sec.
Univ., LLC, 823 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 2016).
23
See Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1151 (9th Cir. 2002)
(quoting Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 2002))
(stating that the New Kids on the Block test “better evaluates the likelihood of
confusion in nominative [fair] use cases”).
24
Century 21 Real Estate, 425 F.3d at 222 (giving broader protections for
nominative fair use than the Ninth Circuit grants under New Kids by allowing a
defendant to prevail despite a plaintiff proving “likelihood of confusion”).
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relevant “likelihood of confusion” factors in nominative fair use
cases.25
Most recently, the Second Circuit deepened the split.26 The
Second Circuit held that nominative fair use is not an affirmative
defense, but constructed a similar standard to that of the Third
Circuit.27 Now, district courts in the Second Circuit must
deliberately review each of the eight “likelihood of confusion”
factors, and then discuss the Ninth Circuit’s three-part nominative
fair use test, creating an eleven-step review for nominative fair use
claims.28
Part II of this Article examines the statutory basis of trademark
rights and the limits that courts have placed on those rights through
developing “fair use” doctrines along with the issues courts have
faced along the way.29 Part III then compares the standards set by
the Ninth, Third, and Second Circuits for the doctrine of
nominative fair use, discussing the rationale for each decision and
effects on future litigation.30 Part IV argues that the Second
Circuit’s new approach runs contrary to the doctrine because the
mark is created for the defendant’s use, which makes multiple
“likelihood of confusion” factors consistently inapplicable.31
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit test that district courts in the Second
25

Century 21 Real Estate, 425 F.3d at 225–26 (asking future courts only to
examine relevant factors).
26
See generally Sec. Univ., 823 F.3d 153 (overruling the Second Circuit’s
district courts’ established practice of using the Ninth Circuit’s three-part test,
substituting an eleven-part analysis).
27
See id. at 167–68 (describing the Third Circuit method, then laying out the
approach for future Second Circuit cases).
28
See id. at 168 (requiring future courts to evaluate every “likelihood of
confusion” factor including those that do not apply, explaining why they do not
apply, before moving to the nominative fair use test).
29
Infra Part II. Section A.
30
Infra Parts III., IV.
31
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1054, 1127 (2012); see also Sec. Univ., 823 F.3d at 168
(requiring review of every factor despite the fact that “similarity of the marks,”
“strength of the mark,” and “proximity of the products and their competitiveness
with one another” will weigh in favor of the plaintiff when the whole point of a
certification mark is for another’s use, and nominative fair use is the defendant
describing the plaintiff’s product).
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Circuit had been using for at least ten years32 will save judicial
resources by focusing opinions on relevant factors.33 Further, a
uniform test will help users and potential litigants make rational
decisions based on an established legal standard and reduce
litigation costs that result from briefing and litigating eleven issues
– some irrelevant – rather than just three.34
II.
TRADEMARK AND CERTIFICATION MARK LAW
American trademark law grew out of English law in which
guilds required members to display the guild’s mark on products in
order to cultivate goodwill for the guild.35 In general, trademarks
are source identifiers.36 As it stands today, the purpose of
trademark law is to protect consumers from deception and
encourage competition among producers.37 By giving producers

32

See generally Car–Freshner Corp. v. Getty Images, Inc., 822 F. Supp. 2d
167, 177–78 (N.D.N.Y. 2011); Audi AG v. Shokan Coachworks, Inc., 592 F.
Supp. 2d 246, 269–70 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) (collecting cases); Yurman Studio, Inc.
v. Castaneda, 591 F. Supp. 2d 471, 500–02 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); M. Shanken
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Cigar500.com, No. 07 CIV. 7371(JGK), 2008 WL 2696168,
at *11 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2008); Merck & Co. v. Mediplan Health Consulting,
Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 402, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
33
See New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308
(1992); see also Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1151 (2002)
(making the three nominative fair use factors from New Kids the only factors to
consider in nominative fair use cases).
34
See generally William McGeveran, The Trademark Fair Use Reform Act,
90 B.U. L. REV. 2267 (2010) (describing the financial considerations of
litigating a nominative fair use dispute); compare New Kids on the Block, 971
F.2d at 308, and Cairns, 292 F.3d at 1151 (making the three nominative fair use
factors from New Kids the only factors to consider in nominative fair use cases),
with Sec. Univ., 823 F.3d at 168 (laying out eleven factors for future courts to
consider in every case involving nominative fair use).
35
BEEBE, supra note 15, Introduction at 3–4.
36
Basic Facts: Trademarks, Patents, and Copyrights, U.S. PATENT AND
TRADEMARK
OFFICE,
https://www.uspto.gov/trademarks-gettingstarted/trademark-basics/trademark-patent-or-copyright (last visited Nov. 1,
2016).
37
See generally McKenna, supra note 6; see also BEEBE, supra note 15,
Introduction at 19 (describing trademarks as a “merchandising short–cut” that
allow consumers to make quick, rational purchasing decisions and give
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limited property rights38 in the marks they use to distinguish their
products or services from competitors, the law assures consumers
that when they look for a new cell phone, the phones with an apple
on the back come from Apple, not Samsung or Google.39 At the
same time, the law encourages producers to invest in the quality of
their products or services to develop a positive reputation among
consumers knowing that competitors cannot profit off of the
goodwill associated with their trademark.40 This section will
explore in more detail (A) the statutory authority for trademark
claims; (B) the common law approaches to analyzing trademark
claims; and (C) the development of fair use doctrines, specifically
nominative fair use.
A. Statutory Authority
The Lanham Act41 lays the foundation on which courts have
built the body of trademark law.42 The Lanham Act protects
owners of trademarks from unauthorized use and misuse of their
marks to preserve the integrity and value of the mark for the
producers the opportunity to influence the minds of consumers through verbal,
auditory, visual, and olfactory associations in advertising their marks).
38
See McKenna, supra note 6, at 1840 (“Significantly, this approach did not
generate broad and absolute rights in a trademark. Instead, courts traditionally
protected the exclusive right to use a trademark only within a particular field of
trade and as against direct competitors.”); see infra Part II. Section C.
39
McKenna, supra note 6, at 1844 (“By preserving the integrity of these
symbols, trademark law benefits consumers in both a narrow sense (by
protecting them from being deceived into buying products they do not want) and
a broad sense (by allowing consumers to rely on source indicators generally and
thereby reducing the costs of searching for products in the market).”).
40
Id. at 1856 (“Likewise in Hogg v. Kirby, the Chancery Court intervened
because it considered the publication by the defendant of what appeared to be a
continuation of plaintiff’s magazine a fraud upon the goodwill of the plaintiff’s
periodical.”).
41
The Lanham Act is the main federal statute governing trademark law,
laying the framework for what can be registered, what rights are associated with
registration, what are competitors’ rights, and how those rights are violated. See
15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)–(e) (2002); see also Overview of Trademark Law,
HARVARD LAW, https://cyber.harvard.edu/metaschool/fisher/domain/tm.htm
(last visited Sept. 30, 2016).
42
See KP Permanent Make–Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S.
111, 121, (2004).
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owner, along with the relationship that the owner has built with
consumers.43 A successful claim of certification mark infringement
requires two showings: first, that the mark merits protection, and
second, that the defendant’s use of the mark or a similar mark is
likely to cause confusion.44
When unauthorized entities use a trademark or authorized
entities misuse a trademark, the owner can sue for infringement in
order to protect the integrity and value of the mark for the owner
and its reputation amongst consumers.45 Although trademarks are
used as source identifiers,46 infringing use of the mark is not
limited to confusion about the source.47 Likelihood of confusion as
to the mark owner’s sponsorship, connection, affiliation, or
approval of the defendant’s use will also give rise to an
infringement claim.48
For example, the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders’ uniforms are a
trademark of the organization.49 In 1978, Pussycat Cinema Ltd.
produced and showed its movie, “Debbie Does Dallas” telling the
fictional story of Debbie, a girl chosen to become a “Texas
Cowgirl” cheerleader, who had to perform sexual acts in order to
pay for her travel expenses to get to Dallas.50 During the film,
43

See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012) (defining infringement); see also McGeveran,
supra note 34, at 2277 (“Brand managers and their trademark attorneys define
their professional success by protecting and strengthening the value of [their
marks].”).
44
Brennan’s, Inc. v. Brennan’s Rest., L.L.C., 360 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir.
2004); see, e.g., Am. Angus Ass’n v. Sysco Corp., 829 F. Supp. 807, 819
(W.D.N.C. 1992) (enjoining defendant’s use of “Supreme Certified Angus
Beef” as likely to cause confusion with plaintiff’s [registered] certification
“Certified Angus Beef,” because “there [was] almost a certainty that customers
will be led to believe [Certified Angus Beef] has introduced a new line”).
45
See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114 (imitation of registered mark), 1125 (false
designation of origin) (2012).
46
Id. § 1127.
47
See id. § 1125(a)(1)(A).
48
See id.; Int’l Info. Sys. Sec. Certification Consortium, Inc. v. Sec. Univ.,
LLC, 823 F.3d 153, 161 (2d Cir. 2016); 4 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23:11 (4th ed. 2016).
49
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200,
202 (2d Cir.1979).
50
Id. at 202–03.
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Debbie is shown wearing a uniform very similar to that of the
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders while performing sexual acts.51 The
Dallas Cowboys successfully sued, claiming that although viewers
would probably not be confused as to whether the Dallas Cowboys
were the source of the film, viewers were likely to be misled into
believing that the Dallas Cowboys sponsored or otherwise
approved of the use of the cheerleading uniform and, by
association, Debbie’s chosen method of earning the uniform.52
The owner of the mark does not have unlimited, irrefutable
rights to control its use.53 The Lanham Act54 carves out exceptions
that allow others to use the mark without authorization and free of
liability.55 One such exception, “descriptive fair use” is a defense
for the alleged infringement when the “term is used descriptively,
not as a mark, fairly, and in good faith.”56 In other words, a
business may use another’s mark to describe its own goods or
services in good faith, as long as the use is not likely to confuse

51

Id. at 203 (“Defendants advertised the movie with marquee posters
depicting Debbie in the allegedly infringing uniform and containing such
captions as ‘Starring Ex Dallas Cowgirl Cheerleader Bambi Woods’ and ‘You’ll
do more than cheer for this X Dallas Cheerleader.’”).
52
Id. at 204–05 (“Appellants read the confusion requirement too narrowly. In
order to be confused, a consumer need not believe that the owner of the mark
actually produced the item and placed it on the market. The public’s belief that
the mark’s owner sponsored or otherwise approved the use of the trademark
satisfies the confusion requirement.”) (internal citations omitted).
53
McKenna, supra note 6, at 1841.
54
See generally, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)–(e) (2012); see also Overview of
Trademark
Law,
HARVARD
LAW,
https://cyber.harvard.edu/metaschool/fisher/domain/tm.htm (last visited Sept.
30, 2016).
55
See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (2012) (establishing defenses to trademark
infringement); see also KP Permanent Make–Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I,
Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 121 (2004) (granting fair use as a defense to trademark
infringement).
56
KP Permanent Make-Up, 543 U.S. at 124; see also KP Permanent MakeUp, Inc., 543 U.S. at 112 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4)) (“[U]se of the . . .
term . . . charged to be an infringement is a use, otherwise than as a mark, . . . of
a term . . . which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to
describe the goods or services.”).
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consumers as to the source of the product or the mark owner’s
sponsorship or affiliation with the product.57
B. Common Law Addressing “Likelihood of Confusion” Inquiries
Circuit courts generally agree over how to analyze whether
there is a likelihood of confusion.58 In the Second Circuit, the
Polaroid59 factors as articulated in Starbucks60 govern likelihood of
confusion:
(1) strength of the trademark; (2) similarity of the marks;
(3) proximity of the products and their competitiveness
with one another; (4) evidence that the senior user may
“bridge the gap” by developing a product for sale in the
market of the alleged infringer’s product; (5) evidence of
actual consumer confusion; (6) evidence that the imitative
mark was adopted in bad faith; (7) respective quality of the

57

See infra Part II Section C. Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 102
(2d Cir. 2010) (“The doctrine of nominative fair use allows a defendant to use a
plaintiff’s trademark to identify the plaintiff’s goods so long as there is no
likelihood of confusion about the source of the defendant’s product or the mark–
holder’s sponsorship or affiliation.”) (alterations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
58
See Int’l Info. Sys. Sec. Certification Consortium, Inc. v. Sec. Univ. LLC,
823 F.3d 153, 165 (2d Cir. 2016); see also, e.g., George & Co. LLC v.
Imagination Entm’t Ltd., 575 F.3d 383, 393 (4th Cir. 2009) (laying out nine
factors “(1) the strength or distinctiveness of the plaintiff’s mark as actually used
in the marketplace; (2) the similarity of the two marks to consumers; (3) the
similarity of the goods or services that the marks identify; (4) the similarity of
the facilities used by the markholders; (5) the similarity of advertising used by
the markholders; (6) the defendant’s intent; (7) actual confusion; (8) the quality
of the defendant’s product; and (9) the sophistication of the consuming public”);
Sabinsa Corp. v. Creative Compounds, LLC, 609 F.3d 175, 182 (3d Cir. 2010)
(listing ten factors); Homeowners Grp., Inc. v. Home Mktg. Specialists, Inc.,
931 F.2d 1100, 1106 (6th Cir. 1991) (listing eight factors).
59
See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir.
1961) (“The problem of determining how far a valid trademark shall be
protected with respect to goods other than those to which its owner has applied
it, has long been vexing and does not become easier of solution with the
years.”).
60
Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97 (2d Cir.
2009).
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products; and (8) sophistication of consumers in the
relevant market.61
The Polaroid factors, however, are not exclusive, and like
other factor tests, a factor could be irrelevant to the claim.62 For
example, the fourth factor, bridging the gap between the market in
which the mark owner employs the mark and the market of the
alleged infringer, is irrelevant when considering if a small coffee
shop’s logo is confusingly similar to the iconic Starbucks mermaid
logo because the two users operate in the same space.63 Likewise,
discussing the “similarity of the marks” is unhelpful when
Starbucks sues a newspaper for infringement claiming likelihood
of confusion when the newspaper used the exact Starbucks logo in
an article about complicated coffee orders.64 Applying the factors
should not overshadow what the court ultimately seeks to answer:
“Whether, looking at the products in their totality, consumers are
likely to be confused.”65
C. Nominative Fair Use
Traditional fair use as a defense to trademark infringement is
grounded in the Lanham Act.66 The provision protects defendants
who use a name, term, or device “otherwise than as a mark, . . .
which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to
describe the goods or services of such party.”67 The Supreme Court
applied this provision in KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting
61

Id. at 115.
Sec. Univ., 823 F.3d at 160 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting Arrow Fastener Co. v.
Stanley Works, 59 F.3d 384 (2d. Cir. 1995)) (“No single factor is dispositive,
and cases may certainly arise where a factor is irrelevant to the facts at hand.”).
63
Starbucks, 588 F.3d at 115.
64
See cf. New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d 302 (using the New Kids on the
Block trade name in a newspaper article surveying readers about who their
favorite member of the group is).
65
See Kelly–Brown v. Winfrey, 717 F.3d 295, 307 (2d Cir. 2013) (“The
application of the Polaroid test is not mechanical, but rather, focuses on the
ultimate question of whether, looking at the products in their totality, consumers
are likely to be confused.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
66
See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2012) (listing what the Court has
dubbed “fair use” among several defenses to infringement).
67
§ 1115(b)(4).
62
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Impression I, Inc.,68 allowing the defendant to use the plaintiff’s
trademark “micro color” to describe the defendant’s cosmetic
products.69 The Court found that “the defendant has no independent
burden to negate the likelihood of any confusion in raising the
affirmative defense that a term is used descriptively, not as a mark,
and in good faith.”70 The Court, however, expressly declined to
address the Ninth Circuit’s analysis of nominative fair use in this
context, leaving it up to the circuits to shape the doctrine.71
Nominative fair use differs slightly from traditional, descriptive
fair use72 in that the non-owner uses the mark to describe the
owner’s goods or services because there is no reasonably available
word other than the mark.73 In other words, the non-owner uses the
mark as a source identifier to refer to the product or service that it
represents rather than using the mark to describe the non-owner’s
own product.74 Nominative fair use gives businesses like car repair
shops the ability to use names like Ford, Volkswagen, and Toyota
in their advertising without infringing on the respective

68

543 U.S. 111 (2004).
See generally id.
70
Id. at 124 (emphasis added).
71
Id. at 115 n.3 (“The District Court’s findings as to the generic or descriptive
nature of the term ‘micro color’ and any secondary meaning that term has
acquired by any of the parties, are not before us. Nor are the Court of Appeals’s
holdings on these issues. Nor do we address the Court of Appeals’s discussion
of ‘nominative fair use.’”) (internal citations omitted).
72
Descriptive fair use, grounded in the Lanham Act, allows parties other than
the owner of the mark to use a mark to describe their own products or services.
As a policy matter, fair use promotes competition by preventing businesses from
monopolizing generic terms, thereby inhibiting other businesses from accurately
describing and marketing their goods and services. See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4);
see also KP Permanent Make–Up, 543 U.S. at 123 (recognizing fair use as a
defense to an infringement claim over a trademarked word that described the
mark owner’s product and that the defendant needed to use to describe his own
product).
73
See New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308 (illustrating the need for
specialized categories of fair use).
74
See id. (“To be sure, this is not the classic fair use case where the defendant
has used the plaintiff’s mark to describe the defendant’s own product. Here, the
New Kids trademark is used to refer to the New Kids themselves.”)
69
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manufacturers’ trademarks.75 There remains a possibility that
consumers could be confused about a connection between the user
of the mark and the owner of the mark simply because the use in
question is the exact mark.76 The law tolerates this possibility as
long as the user does not inaccurately imply connection with or
sponsorship of the owner.77 The issue of how and where
nominative fair use fits in trademark litigation remains a point of
debate between the circuits.78 At the center of the debate is the role
of the likelihood of confusion factors in the courts’ analyses.79
Courts first disagree over whether the likelihood of confusion
factors belong in the discussion at all.80 Second, courts disagree
over whether the likelihood of confusion factors should be
discussed in the same analysis as nominative fair use or separately,
with nominative fair use being an affirmative defense.81

75

Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Church, 411 F.2d 350, 352 (9th Cir.
1969).
76
See KP Permanent Make-Up, 543 U.S. at 121–22.
77
See id. (“The common law’s tolerance of a certain degree of confusion on
the part of consumers followed from the very fact that in cases like this one an
originally descriptive term was selected to be used as a mark, not to mention the
undesirability of allowing anyone to obtain a complete monopoly on use of a
descriptive term simply by grabbing it first.”); see also New Kids on the Block,
971 F.2d at 308 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Prestonettes, Inc. v.
Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368, (1924)) (“When the mark is used in a way that does
not deceive the public we see no such sanctity in the word as to prevent its being
used to tell the truth.”).
78
See Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1150 (9th Cir. 2002)
(setting forth the Ninth Circuit’s position on the role of the likelihood of
confusion factors); Century 21 Real Estate Corp v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d
211, 222 (3d Cir. 2005) (making the nominative fair use analysis an affirmative
defense, separate from the likelihood of confusion analysis); Int’l Info. Sys. Sec.
Certification Consortium, Inc. v. Sec. Univ. LLC, 823 F.3d 153, 167 (2d Cir.
2016) (adopting a new approach that adds the nominative fair use test to the end
of the likelihood of confusion analysis).
79
See Sec. Univ., 823 F.3d at 167–68.
80
See Cairns, 292 F.3d at 1150 (holding that the nominative fair use analysis
replaces the likelihood of confusion analysis when relevant).
81
Sec. Univ., 823 F.3d at 167–68 (explaining where the likelihood of
confusion factors fit in the Third and Ninth Circuit analyses and why the Second
Circuit is choosing to go in a different direction).
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III.
SO WHAT IS THE TEST? IT DEPENDS
Circuit courts have struggled to define the proper analysis for
nominative fair use.82 This section will provide greater detail as to
the principles and rationale behind (A) the Ninth Circuit’s decision
creating a nominative fair use test; (B) the Third Circuit’s decision
making nominative fair use an affirmative defense; and (C) the
Second Circuit’s recent decision, which borrows parts of the
rationale from the Third and Ninth Circuits, fashioning an elevenpart nominative fair use analysis. The balancing act between
protecting the owner’s right to control use of the mark and other
users’ interest in distinguishing their products and services from
those of competitors has resulted in a four-way circuit split.83 In
cases involving nominative fair use claims, the Ninth Circuit holds
that the nominative fair use test replaces its test for likelihood of
confusion.84 The Third Circuit evaluates nominative fair use as an
affirmative defense, requiring a plaintiff to prove likelihood of
confusion before shifting the burden to the defendant to
nominative fair use.85 The First Circuit has “recognized the
‘underlying principle’ of nominative fair use, but like several other
circuits, [the First Circuit has] never endorsed any particular
version of the doctrine.”86 Likewise, the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and
Seventh Circuits have recognized the doctrine of nominative fair
use, but have either declined to adopt a formal standard or relied
82

Compare Century 21 Real Estate, 425 F.3d at 220 (paralleling nominative
fair use to classic fair use in terms of its place in the Lanham Act’s enumerated
defenses), with Sec. Univ., 823 F.3d at 167 (agreeing with the Ninth Circuit’s
decision to make nominative fair use a separate inquiry from traditional
likelihood of confusion followed by affirmative defenses because nominative
fair use does not exactly fit the definition of “fair use” under the Lanham Act).
83
See Sec. Univ., 823 F.3d at 166 (listing each circuit’s principal case for
nominative fair use and adding parenthetical information describing differences
among the tests).
84
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 2002).
85
See generally Century 21 Real Estate, 425 F.3d 211.
86
Swarovski Aktiengesellschaft v. Bldg. No. 19, Inc., 704 F.3d 44, 50 (1st
Cir. 2013); see also Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413,
424 (1st Cir. 2007) (“This court has not previously decided whether to endorse
the Ninth Circuit’s test for nominative fair uses, and we have no occasion to do
so here. We have, however, recognized the underlying principle.”).
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only on likelihood of confusion factors in nominative fair use
cases.87
A. Where the Debate Started—The Ninth Circuit
Judge Kozinski, writing for the Ninth Circuit, initiated the
debate about nominative fair use in New Kids on the Block v. News
America Publishing, Inc.,88 by allowing newspapers to use the
trademark “New Kids on the Block” in a survey asking readers
which member of the group was their favorite.89 In that case, the
court had to answer whether such use was likely to confuse
consumers as to the band’s association with the newspaper’s poll.90
The court first addressed and dismissed a classic fair use inquiry
because the defendant newspaper was using the mark to refer to
the New Kids on the Block rather than to describe the defendant’s
own product as classic fair use requires.91 In holding that the
87

Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 155 (4th Cir. 2012) (“We
hasten to add that we are not adopting a position about the viability of the
nominative fair-use doctrine as a defense to trademark infringement or whether
this doctrine should formally alter our likelihood-of-confusion test in some way.
That question has not been presented here and we leave it for another day.”); Bd.
of Supervisors for La. State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll. v. Smack Apparel Co.,
550 F.3d 465, 489 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Although the alleged nominative fair use
should usually be considered along with the likelihood–of–confusion analysis,
we have declined to require any particular method for the consideration in cases
where the nominative use is not a significant factor in the liability determination.
We think this is such a case.”); PACCAR Inc. v. TeleScan Techs., L.L.C., 319
F.3d 243, 256 (6th Cir. 2003) abrogated on other grounds by KP Permanent
Make–Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111 (2004) (“This circuit
has never followed the nominative fair use analysis, always having applied the
Frisch’s Restaurants test. We are not inclined to adopt the Ninth Circuit’s
analysis here. Even if we were to do so, TeleScan’s use of PACCAR’s
trademarks does not fall within the nominative fair use defense.”); Aug. Storck
K.G. v. Nabisco, Inc., 59 F.3d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1995) (“A use of a rival’s mark
that does not engender confusion about origin or quality is therefore
permissible.”) (citation omitted).
88
971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992).
89
Id. at 304 (describing the newspapers’ surveys asking “[w]hich one of the
New Kids is the most popular” and “[w]ho is the best on the block?”).
90
Id. at 308.
91
See id. (“If the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s trademark refers to
something other than the plaintiff’s product, the traditional fair use inquiry will
continue to govern.”)
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newspaper made a “non-infringing nominative use of the mark,”92
the court developed the following test for nominative fair use:
First, the product or service in question must be one not readily
identifiable without use of the trademark; second, only so much of
the mark or marks may be used as is reasonably necessary to
identify the product or service; and third, the user must do nothing
that would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or
endorsement by the trademark holder.93
The Ninth Circuit has reasoned that the traditional test for
likelihood of confusion fit poorly with nominative fair use cases94
and that its version of the Polaroid factors testing likelihood of
confusion95 could not account for the inherent confusion in a
nominative use.96 Because of the poor fit, the test from New Kids
on the Block later replaced the Ninth Circuit’s “likelihood of
confusion” factors for nominative fair use cases.97 The court held
in favor of the defendant newspaper, finding that the defendant did
not do anything to indicate that the New Kids on the Block
sponsored its polls.98

92

Int’l Info. Sys. Sec. Certification Consortium, Inc. v. Sec. Univ. LLC, 823
F.3d 153, 165 (2d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting New
Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 304).
93
New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308.
94
See Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1151 (9th Cir. 2002).
95
See generally AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 346 (9th Cir.
1979) abrogated in part on other grounds by Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain
Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003) (acknowledging that the Sleekcraft factors
were replaced by the New Kids on the Block test in instances of nominative fair
use); see also JL Beverage Co., LLC v. Jim Beam Brands Co., 828 F.3d 1098,
1106 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[O]ur court relies on the eight–factor Sleekcraft test.”).
96
See Cairns, 292 F.3d at 1151 (quoting Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279
F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 2002)) (stating that the New Kids on the Block test
“better evaluates the likelihood of confusion in nominative [fair] use cases”).
97
New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308; Cairns, 292 F.3d at 1150—51.
98
New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308 (“It is no more reasonably possible,
however, to refer to the New Kids as an entity than it is to refer to the Chicago
Bulls, Volkswagens, or the Boston Marathon without using the trademark.”).
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B. The Bifurcated Approach—The Third Circuit
The Third Circuit weighed in on nominative fair use in Century
21 Real Estate Corp v. Lendingtree, Inc.99 At the time, few cases
other than those from the Ninth Circuit had addressed nominative
fair use.100 The Third Circuit took the opportunity to examine and
reject the Ninth Circuit approach that replaced the likelihood of
confusion factors with the nominative fair use test.101 Instead, the
Third Circuit made nominative fair use an affirmative defense that
is addressed after the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of
likelihood of confusion.102
In Century 21, the defendant advertised access to real estate
agents, price comparison tools, and mortgage providers on its
website, naming several companies including Century 21.103
Century 21 sued, claiming that the defendant improperly
referenced Century 21’s trademarked services and that consumers
were likely to be confused as to whether Century 21 was affiliated
with the defendant’s advertisements.104 The defendant responded
asserting nominative fair use.105
Until Century 21, the Third Circuit had not formally
recognized nominative fair use, although its district courts had
encountered parties making the claim.106 Seeing the difficulties
faced by district courts applying the traditional likelihood of
confusion test together with nominative fair use,107 the Third
Circuit took the opportunity to recognize the doctrine formally and
99

425 F.3d 211 (3d Cir. 2005).
Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 219 (3d
Cir. 2005).
101
Id. at 222.
102
Id. (following its interpretation of the rationale in KP Permanent that made
descriptive fair use an affirmative defense under the Lanham Act, making
nominative fair use an affirmative defense allowing a defendant broader
protections for nominative uses with no burden to negate the plaintiff’s showing
of likelihood of confusion).
103
Id. at 214–15.
104
Id. at 215.
105
Id. at 214.
106
Century 21 Real Estate, 425 F.3d at 218.
107
Id. at 219 (acknowledging the poor fit of the likelihood of confusion
factors with nominative fair uses).
100
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“clarify the proper analysis in this area of the law.”108 The Third
Circuit based its analysis on the Supreme Court’s recent decision
in KP Permanent Make-Up.109 The Supreme Court applied the
statutory fair use defense that permits “use of the [trademarked]
name, term, or device charged to be an infringement . . . otherwise
than as a mark.”110 The Third Circuit also agreed with the Ninth
Circuit in adopting a separate analysis for nominative fair use
“because [the Third Circuit’s] traditional likelihood of confusion
test does not apply neatly to nominative fair use cases.”111
However, the Third Circuit disagreed with the Ninth Circuit on
how nominative fair use fits in the analysis.112 The Third Circuit
declined to draw the distinction between the statutory descriptive
fair use defense and nominative fair use, and in doing so, made
nominative fair use an affirmative defense.113 The question of
confusion in descriptive fair use cases revolves around the
defendant’s use of a term “descriptively, not as a mark, fairly, and
in good faith.”114 On the other hand, a nominative fair use employs
the term as a mark not to describe the defendant’s product or
service, but to refer to the plaintiff’s product or service.115 Under
the Third Circuit’s new scheme in nominative fair use cases, the
plaintiff still bears the initial burden of proving likelihood of
confusion.116 Then, even if the plaintiff carries this burden, the

108

Id. at 219.
543 U.S. 111, 124 (2004); Century 21 Real Estate, 425 F.3d at 220–21.
110
15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2012). But see KP Permanent Make–Up, 543 U.S.
at 115 n.3 (noting the Court’s decision not to address nominative fair use “[a]fter
finding that Lasting had conceded that KP used the term only to describe its
goods and not as a mark,” because the statutory affirmative defense of
descriptive fair use fits this type of use).
111
Century 21 Real Estate, 425 F.3d at 222.
112
See id. at 223 (elaborating on the decision to parallel classic fair use and
nominative fair use).
113
Id.
114
KP Permanent Make-Up, 543 U.S. at 124.
115
Century 21 Real Estate, 425 F.3d at 220–21.
116
Id. at 223.
109
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defendant can prevail despite the court finding a likelihood of
confusion by satisfying the three-part nominative fair use test.117
In the interest of fairness to defendants, the Third Circuit
recognized that “the likelihood of confusion test does not lend
itself nicely to a nominative fair use fact pattern.”118 It chose to
eliminate two factors completely because “applied mechanically
[the factors] would inevitably point towards likelihood of
confusion where no likelihood of confusion may actually exist.”119
The court instructed future courts faced with nominative fair use
claims to address only the relevant likelihood of confusion factors,
rather than all of the factors that do not inherently, unfairly point
towards likelihood of confusion.120 Going forward, a plaintiff
would have to meet its burden on likelihood of confusion, after
which a defendant would have the burden of satisfying the Third
Circuit’s modified nominative fair use inquiry by answering the
following questions:
Is the use of plaintiff’s mark necessary to describe [] plaintiff’s
product or service and [] defendant’s product or service? Is only so
much of the plaintiff’s mark used as is necessary to describe the
plaintiff’s products or services? Does the defendant’s conduct or
language reflect the true and accurate relationship between plaintiff
and defendant’s products or services?121
To this point, the Third Circuit stands alone in using this
approach.122 Nevertheless, the Third Circuit’s iteration of the Ninth
117

Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 222 (3d
Cir. 2005).
118
Id. at 224 (“Thus, we must tailor the test and measure only those factors
that are meaningful and probative in the context of nominative fair use.”).
119
Id. at 224–25 (“[T]he first two Lapp factors would indicate a likelihood of
confusion in a case such as this one simply because the mark is being employed
in a nominative manner. By way of example, looking at the similarity of the
mark would automatically lead to the conclusion that the use is likely to confuse
simply because the mark is not merely similar it is identical . . . . Looking at the
strength of CCE’s marks in this case, and in most nominative use cases, would
also weigh in favor of finding that the use is likely to confuse.”).
120
Id. at 224.
121
Id. at 228.
122
Int’l Info. Sys. Sec. Certification Consortium, Inc. v. Sec. Univ., LLC, 823
F.3d 153, 167 (2d Cir. 2016). But see Radiance Found. Inc. v. NAACP, 786
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Circuit’s nominative fair use test could clear up some judicial
uncertainty as to the types of confusion that courts should consider
when analyzing nominative fair use.123 In particular the last
question, asking whether “the defendant’s conduct or language
reflects the true and accurate relationship between plaintiff and
defendant’s products or services,” more fully describes the
concerns that the Ninth Circuit’s third element addresses.124 The
Second Circuit encountered this judicial uncertainty about the
Ninth Circuit’s third nominative fair use element when a district
court, applying the Ninth Circuit’s test, held “that the only type of
confusion relevant to an infringement claim was confusion as to
source.”125 However, this difference has yet to lead a court to the
conclusion that the Third Circuit approach is preferable.126
C. Splitting the Difference—The Second Circuit
The Second Circuit had its opportunity to weigh in on the
matter in International Information Systems Security Certification
Consortium, Inc. v. Security University, LLC,127 in which
F.3d 316, 328—30 (4th Cir. 2015) (categorizing nominative fair use with
descriptive fair use as an affirmative defense without citing language from 15
U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4), and not adopting a formal test for determining whether
nominative fair use has been established); see also Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google,
Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 155 (4th Cir. 2012) (“We . . . are not adopting a position
about . . . whether [the nominative fair use] doctrine should formally alter our
likelihood of confusion test in some way.”).
123
See infra Part III. Section C. (discussing the Second Circuit’s district judge
considering only source confusion when the judge should have looked at
affiliation, sponsorship, or approval confusion in addition to source).
124
See Sec. Univ., 823 F.3d at 167 (holding that district courts are to consider
the Ninth Circuit and Third Circuit’s nominative fair use factors, then continuing
to combine the two versions of the test into one). Compare New Kids on the
Block v. News Am. Publ’g Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (1992) (“[T]hird, the user
must do nothing that would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship
or endorsement by the trademark holder.”), with Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v.
Lendingtree Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 228 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Does the defendant’s
conduct or language reflect the true and accurate relationship between plaintiff
and defendant’s products or services?”).
125
See Sec. Univ., 823 F.3d at 155—56.
126
See id. at 166 (citing circuit court opinions that have adopted variations of
the Ninth Circuit test, not the Third Circuit test).
127
823 F.3d 153.
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International Information Security Certification Consortium, Inc.
(“ISC”) sued Security University (“SU”) alleging that SU’s use of
ISC’s certification mark, CISSP® (“Certified Information Systems
Security Professional”), constituted infringement under the
Lanham Act.128 ISC registered its certification mark CISSP® for
individuals who met ISC’s “requirements and standards of
competency in the information security field, including passing the
CISSP® certification examination that [ISC] administers.”129
SU offers courses for information security training, including a
course on taking the CISSP® exam.130 SU was allowed to use the
CISSP® certification mark131 and promote its instructors as
CISSP®-certified.132 In its advertisements, SU marketed one of its
instructors as “Master CISSP® Clement Dupuis” or “CISSP
Master Clement Dupuis.”133 ISC argued that use of “Master” before
or after the certification mark improperly implies that the instructor
held some higher certification that did not in fact exist, and
consumers were likely to be confused.134 SU argued that its
advertisements constituted nominative fair use.135
The district court applied the New Kids on the Block factors
and held for SU, finding that using “Master” was not likely to
confuse consumers as to the source of the service that SU was
selling, and thus SU’s use of the mark was a nominative fair use.136
However, the district court failed to consider likelihood of

128

Sec. Univ., 823 F.3d at 155.
Id.
130
Id. at 156.
131
See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012) (explaining that certification marks are
intended for use by someone other than the owner of the mark).
132
Sec. Univ., 823 F.3d at 157.
133
Id.
134
See id. at 157; see also e.g. Tea Bd. of India v. Republic of Tea, Inc., 80
U.S.P.Q.2d 1881 (T.T.A.B. 2006) (“The Trademark Board held that the fact that
applicant’s ‘Darjeeling Nouveau’ tea was, in all circumstances, made entirely of
genuine, certified ‘Darjeeling’ tea, and merely purported to meet higher
standards as the ‘first press,’ was irrelevant.”).
135
Sec. Univ., 823 F.3d at 158.
136
Id. at 158–59.
129
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confusion over ISC’s sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of
SU’s use of the mark.137
On appeal, the Second Circuit noted this error, commenting, “it
is hard to imagine a case in which use of a certification mark by a
person who has met the requirements for certification would likely
lead to confusion as to source or origin.”138 However, the court did
not remand based on this error.139 Because the district courts in the
Second Circuit had been applying the Ninth Circuit test,140 the
Second Circuit took the opportunity to set its own method for
future likelihood of confusion and nominative fair use cases.141
Going forward,
[w]hen considering a likelihood of confusion in nominative
fair use cases, in addition to discussing each of the
Polaroid factors, courts are to consider: (1) whether the use
of the plaintiff’s mark is necessary to describe both the
plaintiff’s product or service and the defendant’s product or
service, that is, whether the product or service is not readily
identifiable without use of the mark; (2) whether the
defendant uses only so much of the plaintiff’s mark as is
necessary to identify the product or service; and (3)
whether the defendant did anything that would, in
conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or
endorsement by the plaintiff holder, that is, whether the
defendant’s conduct or language reflects the true or
accurate relationship between plaintiff’s and defendant’s
products or services.142
137

See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2012); see also Sec. Univ., 823 F.3d at 162.
Id. at 158–59.
139
Id.
140
See id. at 166 (citing district court opinions); see, e.g., Car–Freshner Corp.
v. Getty Images, Inc., 822 F. Supp. 2d 167, 177–78 (N.D.N.Y. 2011); Audi AG
v. Shokan Coachworks, Inc., 592 F. Supp. 2d 246, 269–70 (N.D.N.Y. 2008)
(collecting cases); Yurman Studio, Inc. v. Castaneda, 591 F. Supp. 2d 471, 500–
02 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); M. Shanken Commc’ns, Inc. v. Cigar500.com, No. 07 CIV.
7371(JGK), 2008 WL 2696168, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2008); Merck & Co. v.
Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 402, 413 (S.D.N.Y.2006).
141
Sec. Univ., 823 F.3d at 168.
142
Id. at 168.
138
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At this point, there are three distinct approaches for addressing
nominative fair use claims, in addition to a group of circuits that
have not formally adopted a nominative fair use test.143 However,
in September of 2016, SU filed a petition for a writ of certiorari,
asking the Supreme Court to resolve the circuit split over
nominative fair use.144 The International Trademark Association
filed an amicus brief in October of 2016, urging the Court to
answer “[w]hat the proper standard under the Lanham Act is for
analyzing a defendant’s nominative use of a plaintiff’s
trademark.”145
IV.

WHAT SHOULD BE THE TEST FOR NOMINATIVE FAIR
USE?
The following subsections argue that the Ninth Circuit test
from New Kids on the Block that the Second Circuit endorsed in
Security University is, alone, sufficient for resolving nominative
fair use cases because (A) district courts had been successfully
using the Ninth Circuit test,146 (B) the non-exclusive Polaroid
factors do not easily apply to nominative fair use,147 and (C) an
eleven-part analysis of nominative fair use is a waste of judicial
143

See Swavrovski Aktiengesellschaft v. Bldg. No. 19, Inc., 704 F.3d 44, 50
(1st Cir. 2013) (recognizing “the ‘underlying principle’ of nominative fair use”
without adopting a particular version of the test); see also Bd. of Supervisors for
La. St. Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll. V. Smack Apparel Co., 550 F.3d 465, 488–
89 (5th Cir. 2008) (giving instructions to defendants who want to claim
nominative fair use without stating whether the court will treat it as an
affirmative defense but holding that “[i]n order to avail oneself of the
nominative fair use defense ‘the defendant (1) may only use so much of the
mark as necessary to identify the product or service and (2) may not do anything
that suggests affiliation, sponsorship, or endorsement by the markholder’”).
144
Katie Howard, Security University, LLC v. International Information
Systems Security Certification Consortium, Inc.; Pending Petition,
SCOTUSBLOG,
(Oct.
19,
2016),
http://www.scotusblog.com/casefiles/cases/security-university-llc-v-international-information-systems-securitycertification-consortium-inc/.
145
Id.
146
See Int’l Info. Sys. Sec. Certification Consortium, Inc. v. Sec. Univ., 823
F.3d 153, 166–67 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing district court cases using the Ninth
Circuit test).
147
See Kelly-Brown v. Winfrey, 717 F.3d 295, 307 (2d Cir. 2013).
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resources.148 The Second Circuit could have resolved Security
University without addressing the issue of nominative fair use by
remanding the case after finding that the district court failed to
consider whether consumers could be confused as to ISC’s
association with, or sponsorship of, SU’s use of “Master” next to
the CISSP® mark.149 This would have allowed the Second Circuit
to remain neutral on the issue of nominative fair use.150
A. The Second Circuit Should Have Adopted the Ninth Circuit
Nominative Fair Use Test that District Courts in the Second
Circuit Had Been Using
Before Security University, the Second Circuit had not
instructed district courts to use either the Ninth or the Third
Circuit’s rule on nominative fair use.151 However, the Second
Circuit had acknowledged that the district court “[applied] the
standard for non-trademark or ‘nominative’ fair use set forth by the
Ninth Circuit in New Kids on the Block.”152 In addition, the district
court from Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc.,153 applied the Ninth
Circuit test for nominative fair use.154 On appeal, the Second
Circuit held that “a defendant may lawfully use a plaintiff’s
trademark where doing so is necessary to describe the plaintiff’s
product and does not imply a false affiliation or endorsement by
the plaintiff of the defendant.”155 However, like the First Circuit’s
148

See generally McGeveran, supra note 34.
Sec. Univ., 823 F.3d at 162.
150
See id. at 166.
151
Id. (describing the holdings in prior cases including Tiffany (NJ) in which
the Second Circuit did not overrule the district court’s use of the New Kids on
the Block test, but did not formally hold that the Ninth Circuit test for
nominative fair use is the proper standard going forward).
152
See Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 156 (2d Cir. 2002)
(remanding the for further fact finding on other instances of infringement); see
also Sec. Univ., 823 F.3d at 166 (naming a laundry list of district court opinions
that had used the New Kids on the Block test without reprimand or correction by
the appellate court).
153
600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010); infra Part IV. Section A.1.
154
Tiffany (NJ), 600 F.3d at 102.
155
Compare Tiffany (NJ), 600 F.3d at 102–03, with New Kids on the Block,
971 F.2d at 308 (“First, the product or service in question must be one not
readily identifiable without use of the trademark; second, only so much of the
149
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current position, the Second Circuit recognized the doctrine of
nominative fair use without formally adopting a standard.156
Before Security University, district courts had conceded that
the Second Circuit had yet to affirm the nominative fair use
doctrine but continued to apply the Ninth Circuit test anyway,
citing binding authority from the Second Circuit like Tiffany and
Chambers in support of the principles.157 Applying the New Kids
on the Block test had, in reality, become the accepted practice
among district courts in the Second Circuit.158 Courts had even
taken the time to compare the Third Circuit standard,159 with the
Ninth Circuit test and found that “the outcome would be the same
under either analytical framework.”160 The following subsections
illustrate the cases underlying (1) the Second Circuit district
courts’ acceptance of the Ninth Circuit formulation of the
nominative fair use test and (2) the district courts’ decision not to

mark or marks may be used as is reasonably necessary to identify the product or
service; and third, the user must do nothing that would, in conjunction with the
mark, suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder.”).
156
Compare Swavrovski Aktiengesellschaft v. Bldg. No. 19, Inc., 704 F.3d
44, 50 (1st Cir. 2013) (accepting the doctrine of nominative fair use but
choosing not to adopt a specific standard for analysis), with Tiffany (NJ), 600
F.3d at 102–103 (recognizing the doctrine of nominative fair use and the district
court’s application of the New Kids on the Block test but choosing not to adopt
the test in this case).
157
Car–Freshner Corp. v. Getty Images, Inc., 822 F. Supp. 2d 167, 177
(N.D.N.Y. 2011) (“However, a number of district courts within the Second
Circuit have applied this doctrine when considering claims of trademark
infringement . . . As a result, the Court assumes, for purposes of deciding the
instant motion, that the doctrine is applicable.”) (internal citations omitted); see
also Tiffany (NJ), 600 F.3d at 102.
158
Audi AG v. Shokan Coachworks, Inc., 592 F. Supp. 2d 246, 269
(N.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing case law that suggests “all have followed the standard
set forth by the Ninth Circuit in New Kids”).
159
Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 217–24
(3d Cir. 2005) (using nominative fair use as an affirmative defense, requiring a
likelihood of confusion inquiry, shifting the burden to the defendant to show
nominative fair use).
160
Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 495 (S.D.N.Y. 2008),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010) (remanded for additional
findings of fact).
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adopt the Third Circuit’s standard because the Third Circuit
generally misinterprets the doctrine.
1.

District Courts Accepting the Ninth Circuit Formulation
Prior to Security University, district courts had accepted the
Second Circuit’s refusal to adopt or reject the Ninth Circuit
nominative fair use test.161 But because the Second Circuit had
implicitly affirmed the application of the test, district courts
operated under the assumption that the doctrine was applicable and
the Ninth Circuit test was the proper standard.162 For example, in
Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc,163 Tiffany sued eBay for trademark
infringement because eBay advertised selling Tiffany jewelry on
its website, but some of the sellers were offering counterfeit
jewelry.164 eBay asserted that its use of the Tiffany trademark in
advertising on its homepage and through sponsored links on
Yahoo! and Google constituted nominative fair use.165 The district
court agreed with eBay.166
In its analysis, the district court used the three-part test as
stated in New Kids on the Block167 and found that “eBay’s use of
the Tiffany’s marks was protected under the nominative fair use
doctrine.”168 On appeal, the Second Circuit described nominative
fair use as allowing “[a] defendant [to] use a plaintiff’s trademark
to identify the plaintiff’s goods so long as there is no likelihood of
confusion about the source of [the] defendant’s product or the
mark-holder’s sponsorship or affiliation.”169 The appellate court
also laid out the test as stated by the Ninth Circuit.170 However, the
161

Car-Freshner, 822 F. Supp. 2d at 177.
Id. (citing Chambers v. Time Warner).
163
576 F. Supp. 2d 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
164
Tiffany (NJ), 576 F. Supp. 2d at 469.
165
Id.
166
Id.
167
New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th
Cir. 1992).
168
Tiffany (NJ), 576 F. Supp. 2d at 496.
169
Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 102 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting
Merck & Co. v. Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 402, 413
(S.D.N.Y. 2006)).
170
Id. at 102.
162
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court ultimately held that it “need not address the viability of the
doctrine to resolve Tiffany’s claim” because the Second Circuit
had already “recognized that a defendant may lawfully use a
plaintiff’s trademark where doing so is necessary to describe the
plaintiff’s product and does not imply a false affiliation or
endorsement by the plaintiff of the defendant.”171
2.

The Third Circuit’s Approach Misinterprets the Doctrine
The Third Circuit’s decision to treat nominative fair use as an
affirmative defense was based on the Supreme Court’s holding in
KP Permanent that non-owners may use a trademarked word as a
descriptive term for the non-owner’s own product or service.172
Although the Third Circuit intended to follow the lead of the
Supreme Court in making nominative fair use an affirmative
defense, the context of the use in KP Permanent does not fit with
nominative fair use.173 The Supreme Court was interpreting a
provision of the Lanham Act that makes a non-source-identifying
use of another’s mark to describe the defendant’s own product or
service a fair use.174 However, a nominative use employs the mark
for its source identifying purpose, referring to the owner’s product
171

Compare Tiffany (NJ), 600 F.3d at 102–03 (“We have recognized that a
defendant may lawfully use a plaintiff’s trademark where doing so is necessary
to describe the plaintiff’s product and does not imply a false affiliation or
endorsement by the plaintiff of the defendant.”), with New Kids on the Block,
971 F.2d at 308 (“First, the product or service in question must be one not
readily identifiable without the use of the trademark; second, only so much of
the mark or marks may be used as is reasonably necessary to identify the
product or service; and third, the user must do nothing that would, in
conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the
trademark holder.”) (emphasis added).
172
KP Permanent Make–Up v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 118–
20 (2004).
173
See Int’l Info. Sys. Sec. Certification Consortium, Inc. v. Sec. Univ., LLC,
823 F.3d 153, 167 (2d Cir. 2016) (distinguishing the Supreme Court’s opinion in
KP Permanent as it applied fair use according to the Lanham Act from
nominative fair use, arguing that the latter falls outside the Lanham Act). But see
Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 222 (3d Cir.
2005) (equating descriptive fair use, in which the defendant does not use the
mark for source identification, with nominative fair use, in which the defendant
uses the mark to refer to the plaintiff).
174
KP Permanent Make-Up, 543 U.S. at 118–20.
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or service.175 Moreover, Congress enumerated several affirmative
defenses to trademark infringement in the Lanham Act, including
classic fair use, but did not include nominative fair use.176 Using
the language of the statute, decisions from other circuits, and letter
briefs from the United States Patent and Trademark Office
indicating its position on the nominative fair use doctrine, the
Second Circuit properly inferred that “[i]f Congress had wanted
nominative fair use to constitute an additional affirmative defense,
it would have provided as such.”177 Accordingly, the Second
Circuit rejected the Third Circuit’s decision to treat nominative fair
use as an affirmative defense.178
In part, the Third Circuit chose not to replace its likelihood of
confusion test “in order to distribute the burden of proof
appropriately between the parties at each stage of the analysis.”179
The Third Circuit’s interpretation of the Ninth Circuit test was that
the defendant had the burden to prove nominative fair use without
requiring the plaintiff to show confusion first.180 The Supreme
Court “explicitly rejected such a proposition in KP Permanent
Make-Up.”181
While some district courts in the Ninth Circuit had assigned the
burden of proof as the Third Circuit described it, Judge Kozinski,
again writing for the Ninth Circuit, cleared up the confusion over
allocating the burden in Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Tabari.182 “A defendant seeking to assert nominative fair use as a
defense need only show that it used the mark to refer to the
175

See New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 307–08 (discussing and describing
where nominative fair use fits in likelihood of confusion analysis).
176
See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2012) (naming, among others, descriptive fair
use as an affirmative defense to trademark infringement); see also Sec. Univ.,
823 F.3d at 167 (citing authorities to support the proposition that if Congress
intended to make nominative fair use an affirmative defense, it could and would
have in this section of the Lanham Act).
177
Sec. Univ., 823 F.3d at 167–68.
178
Id.
179
Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 232 (3d
Cir. 2005).
180
Id.
181
Id.
182
610 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2010).
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trademarked good [or service].”183 The court explained that the
plaintiff is responsible for showing that the defendant’s use of the
mark was not nominative fair use by showing evidence of
confusion over sponsorship or endorsement.184
The nominative fair use test as stated by the Ninth Circuit
appears to have worked in the Second Circuit until Security
University.185 The court could have remanded the case for the
district court’s error of law in considering only source confusion
for the nominative fair use analysis.186 Such a ruling would have
resolved the district court’s apparent uncertainty about the
application of the third element in the Ninth Circuit’s nominative
fair use test by incorporating the language added by the Third
Circuit.187 In addition, district courts had a well-developed body of
cases from the Ninth Circuit applying the New Kids on the Block
test.188 The Second Circuit should have taken this opportunity to
formally adopt the standard that its district courts had been using
183

Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., 610 F.3d at 1183.
Id. at 1182 (describing further that the part of this showing includes the
first two elements of nominative fair use, that the defendant needed to use the
plaintiff’s mark, and that the defendant only used as much of the mark as was
necessary for defendant’s purposes).
185
See generally, e.g., Car–Freshner Corp. v. Getty Images, Inc., 822 F. Supp.
2d 167 (N.D.N.Y. 2011); Audi AG v. Shokan Coachworks, Inc., 592 F. Supp.
2d 246 (N.D.N.Y. 2008).
186
See Int’l Info. Sys. Sec. Certification Consortium, Inc. v. Sec. Univ., LLC,
823 F.3d 153, 162 (2d Cir. 2016).
187
Id. at 169 (“Additionally, when considering the third nominative fair use
factor, courts must not, as the district court did here, consider only source
confusion, but rather must consider confusion regarding affiliation, sponsorship,
or endorsement by the markholder.”).
188
See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 812 (9th
Cir. 2003) (“We hold that Forsythe’s use of Mattel’s Barbie qualifies as
nominative fair use. All three elements weigh in favor of Forsythe. Barbie would
not be readily identifiable in a photographic work without use of the Barbie
likeness and figure. Forsythe used only so much as was necessary to make his
parodic use of Barbie readily identifiable, and it is highly unlikely that any
reasonable consumer would have believed that Mattel sponsored or was
affiliated with his work. The district court’s grant of summary judgment to
Forsythe on Mattel’s trade dress infringement claim was, therefore, proper.”);
Stevo Design, Inc. v. SBR Mktg. Ltd., 968 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1089 (D. Nev.
2013).
184
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for years and that the Second Circuit itself had implicitly
approved.189
B. The Polaroid Factors Do Not Easily Apply to Nominative Fair
Use Cases
This subsection discusses (1) how half of the Polaroid factors
unfairly prejudiced the defendant in the first application of the
Second Circuit’s nominative fair use test and (2) how the Second
Circuit should have designed a more efficient, less prejudicial
nominative fair use test. The Second Circuit has repeatedly held
that “the Polaroid test is not mechanical,”190 that some factors “are
a bad fit,” and that the factors “are non-exclusive.”191 However, in
nominative fair use cases, the Second Circuit still requires district
courts to review each Polaroid factor deliberately, and if any factor
does not apply, to explain why.192
The district court in Nespresso USA, Inc. v. Africa Am. Coffee
Trading Co. LLC, was the first to apply the new standard.193
Plaintiff Nespresso, a federally registered trademark, produces
espresso and coffee machines in addition to the capsules used in its
machines.194 Defendant Libretto produces espresso capsules to fit
in Nespresso machines, with a label on the bottom of Libretto’s
189

See Sec. Univ., 823 F.3d at 167 (citing Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600
F.3d 93, 102–03 (2d Cir. 2010)) (“Further, as discussed below we have endorsed
the principles underlying the nominative fair use doctrine.”).
190
See Kelly–Brown v. Winfrey, 717 F.3d 295, 307 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting
Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97, 115 (2d Cir.
2009)).
191
Sec. Univ., 823 F.3d at 168.
192
Id. at 160 (citing Arrow Fastener Co. v. Stanley Works, 59 F.3d 384, 400
(2d Cir. 1995)) (“[I]t is incumbent upon the district judge to engage in a
deliberate review of each factor, and, if a factor is inapplicable to a case, to
explain why.”).
193
No. 15CV5553–LTS, 2016 WL 3162118, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 2, 2016)
(noting that this case resulted in a default judgment for the plaintiff because the
defendant failed to respond to plaintiff’s complaint, making it difficult to fully
evaluate the effectiveness of the new Second Circuit standard, but the opinion
still provides insight into how the likelihood of confusion factors do not afford
the defendant the necessary protection when the defendant has no choice but to
use the plaintiff’s mark in advertisements and labels).
194
Nespresso USA, 2016 WL 3162118 at *1.
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packaging that reads “Nespresso® compatible” stylized text.195
This led to Nespresso’s infringement claim, and the court’s
discussion of the Security University standard.196 As instructed by
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, the district judge discussed
each of the eight Polaroid factors and then applied the nominative
fair use test.197
1.
Polaroid Factors One through Four Unfairly Weigh in
Favor of Confusion
The court reviewed the first two Polaroid factors: (1) the
strength of the plaintiff’s mark and (2) the similarity of the
marks.198 The strength of the mark is “concerned with the
distinctiveness . . . in the eyes of the consuming public.”199
Nespresso’s mark was federally registered and therefore presumed
distinctive, giving the first factor to Nespresso by legal
presumption.200 In discussing the similarity of the marks, the court
took the time to consider the stylized text of Nespresso’s mark on
defendant’s text box, the prominence of the mark on the
packaging, and the modifying word “compatible” used after the
mark. The court found that the mark was not prominently
displayed, and the defendant used “compatible” to modify
“Nespresso.”201 However, the court held that “Libretto’s use of the
word mark Nespresso which is identical to Nespresso’s own mark,
thus creates a likelihood of confusion.”202 The court failed to
indicate how the defendant could have used the plaintiff’s mark to
tell consumers that its products worked with plaintiff’s espresso

195

Id. at *2.
Id. at *2.
197
Id. at 3–5 (reviewing those factors for which the plaintiff presented
evidence and still discussing those factors that require proof on both sides of the
issue, such as defendant’s good or bad faith in adopting the mark and evidence
of actual confusion, even though the defendant failed to answer and the court
was deciding on default judgment).
198
Id. at *3.
199
Id.
200
Nespresso USA, 2016 WL 3162118 *3.
201
Id.
202
Id.
196
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machine without creating a likelihood of confusion over the
similarity of the marks.203
The court also held that the third and fourth Polaroid factors,
proximity of the products in the marketplace and likelihood of
Nespresso bridging the gap, weighed in favor of the plaintiff
Nespresso.204 The products at issue were the exact same in this
case—espresso capsules that fit Nespresso’s machine.205 “There is
clear proximity in the marketplace, since both Nespresso and
Libretto operate in the same market and sell the same type of
goods,” thus factor three weighs in favor of Nespresso.206 “Because
the products offered by Nespresso and Libretto are for all intents
and purposes the same, and the market they operate in is identical,
there is no gap for Nespresso to bridge,” and factor four weighs in
favor of Nespresso.207 The defendant found itself behind four
factors to zero on likelihood of confusion simply because it had to
refer to the plaintiff’s machine to tell consumers what its product
did.208
2.
Removing Polaroid Factors from the Nominative Fair Use
Analysis Would Lead to More Consistent and Correct Results
The Second Circuit’s decision to include all eight Polaroid
factors in its nominative fair use test unfairly prejudices potential
users.209 The Ninth Circuit solved this problem by using the New
Kids on the Block test to supplant its likelihood of confusion test.210
The Ninth Circuit recognized that “likelihood of confusion” factors
that focus “on the similarity of the mark used by the plaintiff and
the defendant,” would lead to the incorrect conclusion that all

203

See id.
Id.
205
Id.
206
Nespresso USA, 2016 WL 3162118, at *3.
207
Id.
208
Id.
209
See supra Part IV. Section B.1.
210
New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th
Cir. 1992); Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1150–51 (9th Cir.
2002).
204
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nominative uses are confusing.211 Likewise, other circuits have
addressed the same issue.212 For example, the Fourth Circuit
asserted that “the application of the traditional multi-factor test is
difficult because often many of the factors are either unworkable or
not suited or helpful as indicators of confusion in this context.”213
Even the Third Circuit, that maintained a two-part inquiry in
nominative fair use cases, eliminated “those factors used to
establish confusion in other trademark infringement cases that do
not ‘fit’ in the nominative use context.”214 In particular, the Third
Circuit removed consideration of “degree of similarity between the
owner’s mark and the alleged infringing mark,” and “strength of
the owner’s mark” because the defendant in a nominative fair use
case is using the plaintiff’s mark, and consideration of these factors
would unfairly favor a finding of likelihood of confusion.215 The
Third Circuit went on to recognize that certain other factors were
not applicable to the case at bar and set the example for lower

211

See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 2002)
(“The three–factor test—with its requirements that the defendant use marks only
when no descriptive substitute exists, use no more of the mark than necessary,
and do nothing to suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the mark holder—
better addresses concerns regarding the likelihood of confusion in nominative
use cases.”).
212
See, e.g., Bd. of Supervisors for La. State Univ. Agric. & Mech. Coll. v.
Smack Apparel Co., 550 F.3d 465, 489 (5th Cir. 2008) (“In order to avail
oneself of the nominative fair use defense ‘the defendant (1) may only use so
much of the mark as necessary to identify the product or service and (2) may not
do anything that suggests affiliation, sponsorship, or endorsement by the
markholder.’”); Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 155 (4th Cir.
2012); August Storck K.G. v. Nabisco, Inc., 59 F.3d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1995)
(“A use of a rival’s mark that does not engender confusion about origin or
quality is therefore permissible.”).
213
See Rosetta Stone, 676 F.3d at 155 (“We have merely attempted to
highlight the problems inherent in the robotic application of each and every
factor in a case involving a referential, non-trademark use. Accordingly, the
district court did not commit reversible error in failing to address every factor.”).
214
Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 222 (3d
Cir. 2005).
215
Id. at 224–25.
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courts by analyzing only those factors which were relevant in the
plaintiff’s “likelihood of confusion” argument.216
C. An Untested Eleven-Part Analysis of Nominative Fair Use Is
Inefficient Because It Causes Repetitive Litigation and
Requires Time to Develop
This subsection will explore in greater detail (1) how the
Polaroid factors analysis followed by the nominative fair use test
will cause the parties to repeat arguments on the same issues, and
(2) how developing a new standard will cost parties and courts in
the Second Circuit time and money. The Second Circuit has fully
admitted that some Polaroid factors are irrelevant to certain cases
and that in standard infringement cases, district courts need not
“slavishly recite the litany of all eight Polaroid factors in each any
every case.”217 However, in the nominative fair use context,
Security University requires district courts to discuss each
individual factor.218 It appears that district courts in the Second
Circuit are following this instruction, including discussion of the
strength of the owner’s mark, and the similarity of the marks,
despite the fact that the defendant is using the plaintiff’s exact
mark.219

216

Id. at 225–26 (explaining why some factors were irrelevant with the
purpose of preserving their utility in future cases but directing the lower court to
examine only the relevant factors).
217
Orient Exp. Trading Co. v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 842 F.2d 650, 654
(2d Cir. 1988) (“A district court need only consider sufficient factors to reach
the ultimate conclusion as to whether or not there is a likelihood of confusion.”).
218
Int’l Info. Sys. Sec. Certification Consortium, Inc. v. Sec. Univ., LLC, 823
F.3d 153, 168 (2d Cir. 2016) (“When considering a likelihood of confusion in
nominative fair use cases, in addition to discussing each of the Polaroid factors
. . . .”).
219
Infra Part IV. Section B.; see also 4 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23:11 (4th ed. 2016) (“The other type of fair use is
discussed in this section and is known as a ‘nominative fair use.’ . . . This has
been labeled a non–confusing “nominative use” because it “names” the real
owner of the mark.”).
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1.
The Second Circuit’s Longer Analysis Causes Repetitive
Litigation
The Third Circuit based its rationale for the bifurcated
approach to nominative fair use on the Supreme Court’s holding
that descriptive fair use is an affirmative defense.220 However, the
Third Circuit failed to recognize that the statutory definition of fair
use, which makes it an affirmative defense, does not comport with
nominative fair use.221 Nominative fair use, the use of another’s
mark to describe the owner’s products or services, employs the
mark for its trademark purpose: source identification.222
The Third Circuit also considered a one-sided approach
incorporating the likelihood of confusion factors and the
nominative fair use test, but ultimately rejected the idea of
incorporating additional considerations “into the already lengthy
ten-part test for confusion.”223 However, the concurring judge
criticized the majority for its logically inconsistent and “judicially
unmanageable” standard.224 The majority instructed future courts to
weigh the “intent of the defendant in adopting the mark” in the
plaintiff’s prima facie case.225 But, inquiry into the defendant’s
intent required the court to look at the purpose of the defendant’s
220

See Century 21 Real Estate, 425 F.3d at 222–23.
Compare id. (“Classic fair use and nominative fair use are different in
certain respects, but it is unclear to us why we should ask radically different
questions when analyzing a defendant’s ability to refer to a plaintiff’s mark in
the two contexts.”), with 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (“That the use of the name,
term, or device charged to be an infringement is a use, otherwise than as a mark
. . . .”).
222
See generally Sec. Univ., 823 F.3d at 167 (differentiating between using a
trademarked word descriptively, that is, for non-trademark purposes, and using
another’s mark as a mark to refer to the owner as the source of the good or
service).
223
Century 21 Real Estate, 425 F.3d at 224.
224
Id. at 232–233, 238 (Fisher, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(concurring as to the outcome of the case but dissenting as to the bifurcated
approach).
225
Id. at 240 (Fisher, J., dissenting) (“[T]he majority holds that ‘if the court
finds that the defendant made use of the plaintiff’s mark with the very purpose
of causing consumers to think the plaintiff endorses or sponsors plaintiff’s good
or service, then the likelihood that consumers will be confused as to
endorsement/affiliation is greater.’ Maj. Op. at 226.”).
221
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use, the prominence or degree of use, and the truthfulness of the
use.226 These considerations in the prima facie case are the three
elements of the affirmative defense.227 On remand, the district court
would consider “the purpose, prominence, and truthfulness of the
defendant’s conduct as part of the plaintiff[‘s] likelihood of
confusion case.”228 Then the district court would “also be required
to look to the same factors when entertaining the defendant’s
affirmative defense.”229 Although the majority in Century 21
intended to follow the lead of the Supreme Court in grouping
descriptive and nominative fair use as affirmative defenses, “where
confusion is the central focus on each side, the majority [read] KP
Permanent to hold that both: 1) defendant bears no burden of
negating confusion, and 2) defendant bears a burden of negating
confusion.”230
The Second Circuit rejected the bifurcated approach taken by
the Third Circuit in part because of its expected minimal effect on
the outcome of cases, but more assertively because “[i]f Congress
had wanted nominative fair use to constitute an additional
affirmative defense, it would have provided as such.”231 In
226

Id. at 226 (asking whether the defendant’s use in context would “confuse
the public as to the relationship between the defendant and plaintiff”).
227
See id. at 241 (Fisher, J., dissenting) (“If the above characterization sounds
familiar, it should. Each and every one of the majority’s ‘nominative fair use’
prongs is nothing more than an inquiry into the likelihood of confusion,
specifically, whether the use is with the intent to confuse due to a presence or
lack of good–faith purpose, prominence and truthfulness.”).
228
Id. at 243 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
229
Century 21 Real Estate, 425 F.3d at 243 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
230
Id. at 246 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
231
See Int’l Info. Sys. Sec. Certification Consortium, Inc. v. Sec. Univ., LLC,
823 F.3d 153, 167 (2d Cir. 2016); see also id. (referring to letter briefs from the
United States Patent and Trademark office apparently stating that the office does
not believe nominative fair use should be an affirmative defense; see also
Tiffany (NJ) v. eBay Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 495 fn.7 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(noting that the bifurcated approach taken by the Third Circuit would have
minimal effect on the outcome of cases) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 600 F.3d 93
(2d Cir. 2010) (remanded for additional findings of fact). But see 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(c)(3)(A) (showing that Congress did consider nominative fair use in
drafting the Lanham Act because under exclusions for dilution claims “[a]ny fair
use, including a nominative or descriptive fair use” are “not actionable as
dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment”).
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addition, the Third Circuit approach makes nominative fair use
protections broader than in the Ninth Circuit where the New Kids
on the Block test determines the outcome.232 As an affirmative
defense, nominative fair use allows defendants to succeed even if
the plaintiff proves the likelihood of confusion, as long as the
defendant affirmatively answers the Third Circuit’s three
nominative fair use questions.233
2.

An Unsettled Standard Raises Costs in and out of Court
In addition to repetitive litigation that wastes judicial
resources,234 businesses suffer from an unsettled standard in
nominative fair use because of uncertainty over how the courts will
apply the new test.235 Because of this uncertainty, potential users
can (1) pay for a license to use the mark, (2) find a less convenient
way to inform consumers what their product or service is, or (3)
assert nominative fair use and risk costly litigation.236 Smaller
businesses that cannot expend large amounts of money on
232

4 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23:11 (4th
ed. 2016) (describing the Third Circuit’s view that nominative fair use as an
affirmative defense coincides with the Supreme Court’s intent in KP Permanent
Make–Up).
233
See Century 21 Real Estate, 425 F.3d at 222 (“Under our fairness test, a
defendant must show; (1) that the use of the plaintiff’s mark is necessary to
describe both the plaintiff’s product or service and the defendant’s product or
service; (2) that the defendant uses only so much of the plaintiff’s mark as is
necessary to describe the plaintiff’s product; and (3) that the defendant’s
conduct or language reflect the true and accurate relationship between [the]
plaintiff and defendant’s products or services.”); see also 4 MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23:11 (4th ed. 2016).
234
See Century 21 Real Estate, 425 F.3d at 243 (Fisher, J., dissenting); supra
Part IV. Section C.1.
235
See McGeveran, supra note 34, at 2275–76 (describing the difficulties for
businesses that do not consistently use others’ marks in their work in
determining whether the cost of appealing to customers without using the mark
outweighs potential litigation costs or a license).
236
Id. at 2276 (“In addition to the monetary costs of rights clearance and
licensing, this excessive caution also constrains expressive choices, stifles open
competition, and reduces the quality of speech and entertainment for its
consumers–that is, for all of us. But many institutions have determined that the
potential cost of defending a lawsuit is too high, even when discounted for the
low likelihood of getting sued and the very low likelihood of paying damages.”).
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advertisements, lack expertise on trademark law, and lack the
resources to consult an attorney will often decide to forego use of
another’s mark even though such use might be legal.237 A short and
pointed inquiry into nominative fair use, such as that of the Ninth
Circuit, would make litigation shorter, less expensive, and more
predictable.238 Attorneys advising small businesses could look to
the well-developed body of nominative fair use cases from the
Ninth Circuit, as well as district courts in the Second Circuit.239
The attorneys could then give recommendations based on
established law, rather than speculation as to what the courts could
or should do.240
Taking the Third Circuit approach would remove some
unnecessary steps in the Second Circuit’s future inquiries into
nominative fair use because the Third Circuit asks district courts to
examine only the relevant factors.241 However, the same approach
requires courts to consider identical factors, purpose, prominence,
and truthfulness, in the plaintiff’s prima facie case and the
defendant’s affirmative defense.242 The Ninth Circuit’s method
sufficiently covers the likelihood of confusion inquiry, and the
twenty-four year history of the New Kids on the Block test gives
courts a substantial body of case law discussing nuances of the
test.243 Even the Third Circuit considered adopting “the Ninth
Circuit test outright, as it has withstood the test of time, [and] has
237

Id. at 2277–78.
See cf. id. at 2278 (standing for the proposition that a statute codifying
nominative fair use would make litigation shorter, less expensive, and more
predictable, just as uniformity in application amongst the circuits would).
239
Id.
240
Id.
241
Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 225–26
(cutting the analysis to four likelihood of confusion factors along with the three
nominative fair use affirmative defense questions).
242
Id. at 243 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
243
See generally, e.g., Audi AG v. Shokan Coachworks, Inc., 592 F. Supp. 2d
246 (citing district court cases that apply only the New Kids on the Block test,
none of which were appealed); Image Online Design, Inc. v. Internet Corp. for
Assigned Names & Numbers, No. CV–12–08968–DDP, 2013 WL 489899 (C.D.
Cal. Feb. 7, 2013) (addressing certification marks); Swarovski
Aktiengesellschaft v. Bldg. No. 19, Inc., 704 F.3d 44, 49 (1st Cir. 2013)
(discussing service marks and endorsement or affiliation confusion).
238
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been tinkered with in no less than seven opinions.”244 The threepart test keeps the burden of proof on the plaintiff to show that the
defendant’s use of the mark is likely to cause confusion as to
source, sponsorship, or endorsement.245 Moreover, it keeps the
defendant’s interest in fair competition at the forefront of the
discussion by looking at whether the defendant’s product or
service is “readily identifiable without the use of the mark,” and
whether the defendant used only so much of the mark “as is
reasonably necessary to identify the product or service.”246
V.
CONCLUSION
The Second Circuit should not have incorporated the doctrine
of nominative fair use as it did in Security University. Instead, it
should have adopted the Ninth Circuit test initially created in New
Kids on the Block for three reasons: (1) district courts had been
successfully using the Ninth Circuit test, (2) the non-exclusive
Polaroid factors do not easily apply to nominative fair use, and (3)
an eleven-part analysis of nominative fair use is a waste of judicial
resources. The Second Circuit’s acknowledgment of the New Kids
on the Block test247 and apparent acquiescence to the district courts’
application of the doctrine of nominative fair use,248 gave the court
the opportunity to adopt the test wholesale in Security
University.249 The Third Circuit’s affirmative defense approach
would allow the Second Circuit to hold on to the Polaroid factors
in a more efficient manner than the Security University standard
does now because the Third Circuit allows courts to focus on

244

Century 21 Real Estate, 425 F.3d at 228.
See Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1182–83
(9th Cir. 2010) (clarifying the position of the Ninth Circuit as to the burden
shifting of the nominative fair use test, placing on the defendant only the burden
of showing “that it used the mark to refer to the trademarked good [or service]”).
246
See New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308
(9th Cir. 1992) (laying out the nominative fair use factors).
247
Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 156 (2d Cir. 2002).
248
Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 102—03 (2d Cir. 2010).
249
Int’l Info. Sys. Sec. Certification Consortium, Inc. v. Sec. Univ., LLC, 823
F.3d 153, 168 (2d Cir. 2016).
245
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relevant factors in determining the likelihood of confusion250 rather
than requiring discussion of each likelihood of confusion factor.251
However, adopting the Third Circuit approach while rejecting
nominative fair use as an affirmative defense would be only a
slight improvement on the Second Circuit’s current standard.252
The Ninth Circuit developed its test and replaced its version of the
Polaroid factors to avoid repetitive litigation and better address
nominative uses in context rather than mechanically applying inapt
factors.253 Finally, the eleven-part analysis required for nominative
fair use claims requires district court judges to review factors—
principally, strength of the mark and similarity of the marks—that
unfairly impact a defendant claiming nominative fair use when the
original purpose of trademark law is to prevent unfair competition
rather than create an unlimited property right.254 If the Supreme
Court grants Security University’s petition for a writ of certiorari,
the Court should adopt the Ninth Circuit test as the proper analysis
for nominative fair use.

250

Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 225–26
(explaining why some factors were irrelevant with the purpose of preserving
their utility in future cases but directing the lower court to examine only the
relevant factors).
251
Sec. Univ., 823 F.3d at 168 (When considering a likelihood of confusion in
nominative fair use cases, in addition to discussing each of the Polaroid factors
. . . .”).
252
See id., 823 F.3d at 168; see also Nespresso USA, Inc. v. Africa Am.
Coffee Trading Co. LLC, No. 15CV5553–LTS, 2016 WL 3162118, at *1, *2–4
(S.D.N.Y. June 2, 2016); Century 21 Real Estate, 425 F.3d at 225–26.
253
See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 2002)
(holding that the New Kids on the Block test will replace the likelihood of
confusion factors in nominative fair use cases); see also Century 21 Real Estate,
425 F.3d at 243 (Fisher, J., dissenting) (arguing that the same issues will be
discussed on both sides of the case).
254
Century 21 Real Estate, 425 F.3d at 225–26; see also KP Permanent
Make–Up v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111 (granting fair use as a
defense to trademark infringement).

